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Introduction
When an expectant mother takes maternity leave to have and care for her newborn child,
social policy has come to dictate that her job ought to be secure and waiting for her when she is
able to return to work.1 The concept of the “stay at home mom” is no longer something expected
of women, and has become a less common practice.2 Most members of society—men and
women—now juggle the dichotomy of work and family life.3 The Family Medical Leave Act of
1993 (“FMLA”) was enacted to ensure job security when certain medical conditions necessitate
that individuals take leave from work in order to care for themselves or their loved ones.4
However, the FMLA is silent as to what protection those individuals are afforded once they
return to their positions or to a comparable one.5
Courts have nevertheless recognized that FMLA protection persists after an employee
returns from leave.6 Once employees return to their positions, the employer is not free to
terminate them for having taken that leave.7 While this right against retaliation is recognized,
courts struggle to find the textual source claim within the language of the FMLA.8 Without
guidance from the Supreme Court on this issue, the circuits disagree on the specific provision in
which the claim is rooted.9 This is not a mere academic inquiry.10 The textual differences
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between the candidate FMLA’s provisions have implications on the burden of proof that a
plaintiff bears in order to establish that their leave was the cause of an employer’s adverse
employment decision.11 Specifically, there is confusion as to whether a “but for” standard of
causation or a lesser “negative factor” standard ought to apply.12 Section I of this comment will
first outline the background of retaliation claims under the FMLA, as well as the standards of
causation which a plaintiff might be required to meet. Section II will describe how the circuits
have approached this issue and the different conclusions that they have reached. Section III will
explore the methodologies of statutory interpretation used by the Supreme Court in analyzing
similar statutes. Finally, Section IV of this comment will argue that the language of the FMLA is
similar to other anti-discrimination statutes the Court has interpreted such that the Court would
likely apply a “but for” causation standard to retaliation claims under the FMLA.
SECTION I
The FMLA
Congress promulgated the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) in order to address
rising concerns that employees did not have adequate job security when tending to the serious
health conditions of either themselves or their immediate family members.13 The FMLA bolsters
job security by “entitl[ing] employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth
or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health
condition employees” to take protected leave.14 While this leave need not be paid, the FMLA
ensures that the leave is protected by prohibiting employers from interfering with employee’s
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right to take leave, or discriminate against those who object to prohibited acts under the statute.15
Furthermore, the FMLA requires the reinstatement of an employee who has taken leave to the
same or “equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and
conditions of employment” upon their return to work.16
The FMLA provides comfort to employees who might need a break from work to care for
themselves or loved ones, knowing that their jobs will be waiting for them when they return.
However, the language of the FMLA seems to suggest that the protection ends there. The FMLA
does not expressly prohibit an employer from taking adverse employment action—i.e.
termination—against an employee immediately following the employee’s reinstatement; in other
words, from retaliating against employees for exercising their rights under the statute.
Nevertheless, both the courts and the Department of Labor (“DOL”) have filled this gap in the
statutory language and recognize a private right of action for employees harmed in this way.17
While all may agree that employees have a right of action for retaliation under the
FMLA, the circuits disagree as to which provision of the FMLA is a basis for such a claim.18
This may seem like an academic inquiry, but it may have a substantial impact on the burden of
proof placed on plaintiffs when establishing a causal link between adverse employment actions
taken against them and their exercise of their rights under the FMLA.19 This is understandable
because the failure of the statute to explicitly address the question means there is no express
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29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).
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regulation 29 C.F.R. §825.200(c)).
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language establishing a standard of causation for such conduct.20 Courts, therefore, analyze the
language of whichever provision they deem as the source of retaliation claims to determine
which causation standard ought to apply.21 Different sources, with different language, can be the
difference between a plaintiff satisfying their burden of proof and successfully seeking a remedy
from the court, or not.
Courts agree that the authority for a retaliation claim rests somewhere in 29 U.S.C. §
2615(a) of the FMLA.22 Paragraph (a), “Interference with rights,” provides:
(1) Exercise of rights
It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.
(2) Discrimination
It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by
this subchapter.23

The dispute is whether the claim arises under subparagraph (a)(1), subparagraph (a)(2), or a
combination of the two.24
Causation
Courts analyzing the language of either subparagraph have proposed two theories of
causation.25 First, is the “but for” causation standard utilized in retaliation claims under other
anti-discrimination statutes such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and
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Id. at 167.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).26 The other is a seemingly more relaxed
“negative factor” standard which was suggested by DOL in its regulation on the enforcement of
the FMLA, 29 C.F.R. 825.200(c), and which finds a parallel in Title VII’s “motivating factor”
standard for status discrimination.27
The Supreme Court has articulated a distinction between “but for” and “motivating
factor,” akin to “negative factor,” standards in anti-discrimination retaliation claims.28 The Court
defines “but for” causation as to “require[] the plaintiff to show that the harm would not have
occurred in the absence of—that is, but for—the defendant’s conduct.”29 Thus, an action is not
the cause of an event “if the particular event would have occurred without it.”30 In the
employment context, this would mean that, under a “but for” standard, plaintiffs must prove that
their employer would not have taken adverse employment action against them if they had not
exercised their rights under the statute.31
The Court also recognizes a lessened standard, referred to as “motivating” factor.32 Under
a “motivating factor” standard, plaintiffs can establish causation by proving only that some
protected condition (their race, sex, status, etc.) was present and pushed in favor of the
employer’s decision to take adverse employment action, even if other factors also motivated the
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Id. at 272.
Egan, 851 F.3d at 273 (3d Cir. 2017); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003);
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 416 (2011).
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Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 431).
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Id.
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Id. (quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265 (5th ed.
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decision and even if the same decision would have been reached based on other nondiscriminatory factors. 33
Under the FMLA, some courts have equated the DOL’s “negative factor” standard to the
“motivating factor” standard expressed by the Supreme Court.34 Courts refer to this lessened
standard as a mixed-motive standard.35 Courts look to the Supreme Court’s application of the
“motivating factor” standard under other anti-discrimination statutes as a template for the
application of the mixed-motive standard under the FMLA.36 The mixed-motive standard
requires plaintiffs must to prove that their employer used their taking of FMLA leave as a factor
in coming to an adverse employment decision, not that it was the “most important factor upon
which the employer acted.”37
“Motivating factor” is distinguishable from “but for” causation because “motivating
factor” causation allows plaintiffs to prove causation in situations where the adverse employment
action would have taken place even if the plaintiff had not exercised his or her rights under a
particular statute, whereas “but for” causation would not.38 Therefore, the causation standard can
play a pivotal role in whether a plaintiff can establish liability. How this applies to the FMLA
relies heavily on statutory interpretation.
SECTION II
Deference to the Department of Labor
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Some courts, when addressing the issue of the causation standard for retaliation claims
under the FMLA, look to the DOL for guidance as to how the statute should be interpreted.39
Although the FMLA does not expressly state the causation standard which applies to retaliation
claims under the statute, the DOL has promulgated a regulation which expressly states that a
“negative factor” standard applies.40 Under the DOL regulation 29 C.F.R. §825.220(c),
“employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions,
such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions.”41 The DOL stated that the purpose of
promulgating this provision was to “state explicitly that the Act's prohibition on interference in
29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1) includes claims that an employer has discriminated or retaliated against an
employee for having exercised his or her FMLA rights.”42 The DOL claimed to have found
authority for retaliation claims under both sections 2615(a)(1) and (a)(2).43 However, the DOL
suggests that the claim fits more neatly under paragraph (a)(1)’s44 bar on interference.45 The
DOL does not, however, explain its rationale for choosing a “negative factor” over a “but for”
standard.
The Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. articulated the
rules concerning appropriate judicial deference to a governmental agency’s construction of a
statute.46 The threshold question, under Chevron, is whether Congress has addressed the issue at
hand.47 Congress has not addressed the issue when “the statute is silent or ambiguous with
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Egan, 851 F.3d at 273.
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The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 FR 67934-01 (Nov. 17, 2008).
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For the purposes of this comment, any reference to paragraphs shall refer those contained in 29 U.S.C. § 2615,
unless otherwise specified.
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The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 FR 67934-01 (Nov. 17, 2008).
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respect to the specific issue.”48 Courts must then decide “whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.”49 However, if congressional intent is clear from the
statute’s language, then the agency’s construction is afforded no deference.50
When there is silence or ambiguity, the courts must then determine whether congress
delegated power to the agency to “fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress” by
promulgating rules and policies.51 If the agency regulation was created pursuant to power
expressly delegated by Congress to fill a legislative gap, then “[s]uch legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.”52 In contrast, the Court noted that when delegation is implicit, “considerable weight” is
to be afforded to the agency’s interpretation.53 In situations where multiple reasonable statutory
interpretation exist, courts should give deference to the agency’s construction unless “it appears
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned.”54 At this stage of the inquiry the agency’s interpretation must only be a
reasonable one.55
Congress expressly gave the DOL authority under Section 2654 of the FMLA to
“prescribe such regulations as are necessary” to enforce the paragraphs at issue in retaliation
claims.56 Because the DOL was delegated authority to make rules and polices regarding the
FMLA and they did so in promulgating 29 C.F.R. 825.220(c), it seems probable Chevron
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deference requires courts to give deference to the DOL if there is a finding of “silence or
ambiguity” in the FMLA, and the DOL’s interpretation is reasonable—a low threshold question.
Therefore, the crux of the issue at hand rests on which provision of the FMLA the claim of
retaliation arises from and whether that provision’s language is silent or ambiguous.
The Circuits’ Approaches
Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc.
The Second Circuit was recently confronted with this issue of determining a causation
standard as a matter of first impression, a case which serves as an example highlighting the
struggles courts face with this question.57 In Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers,
Inc., the court determined both the provision of the FMLA establishing a cause of action for a
retaliation claim and the burden of proof a plaintiff ought to bear in establishing causation in
bringing these claims.58 The plaintiff in Woods was a substance abuse counselor at one of the
defendant’s clinics.59 She had been hospitalized several times during her employment due to
severe anemia.60 The plaintiff claimed that the reason for her terminated absence from work as a
result of her intermittent hospitalization.61 The defendant claimed she was terminated for poor
performance.62 The issue in the case turned on the burden of proof required of the plaintiff to
show causation.63 The Second Circuit ultimately concluded that retaliation claims are grounded
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Woods, 864 F.3d at 166.
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in 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) and, giving deference to the opinion of the DOL, that a “negative
factor” causation standard applies to the claim.64
The Second Circuit looked to the statutory language of each paragraph to determine the
claim’s origin.65 The court reasoned that the claim cannot arise under (a)(2) because an employee
subjected to an adverse employment action as a result of exercising their rights under the FMLA
cannot have said to be “opposing any practice made unlawful”—the language found in paragraph
(a)(2).66 The court instead looked to the rights granted by the FMLA as a whole—the right to
take leave in conjunction with the right to reinstatement—to find that retaliating against an
employee for taking leave “interferes” with an employee’s right to reinstatement.67 Because this
“interference” language is present in (a)(1) rather than (a)(2), the court concluded that the plain
language of the FMLA suggests that the claim arises from paragraph (a)(1). The court also
referenced the DOL’s explanation of 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(c), suggesting that (a)(1) is the source
of retaliation claims, to support of its conclusion.68
Having found that the cause of action lies in subpart (a)(1), the court then determined that
Chevron deference ought to be given to the DOL’s interpretation of the provision, including the
“negative factor” causation standard, was required.69 The court first found that Chevron
deference was appropriate by determining that the DOL was delegated authority by Congress “to
make rules carrying the force of law and [the DOL’s] interpretation to which deference is to be
given was promulgated in the exercise of that authority,” the Chevron threshold inquiry.70 The
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court stated that the Secretary of Labor has the authority to promulgate regulations “to carry out”
the FMLA under 29 U.S.C. § 2654 and that 825.200(c), the source of the DOL’s interpretation of
(a)(1)’s retaliation causation standard, was “promulgated pursuant to that delegation of
authority.”71 Therefore, the court determined that a Chevron inquiry was appropriate.72
Moving to the issue of whether the FMLA is “silent or ambiguous” on the issue, the court
again examined the language of paragraph (a)(1).73 The Second Circuit looked to Supreme Court
cases, discussed infra., analyzing anti-discrimination provisions within other statutes, the “Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII, with similar language to determine if
paragraph (a)(1) is ambiguous in light of those decisions.74 The court distinguished those cases
by finding that paragraph (a)(1) does not contain language—such as words like “because” that
the Court had found within the ADEA and Title VII—suggesting “but for” causation.75
Therefore, the court concluded that the statute is silent on the matter, leaving a gap that Congress
had authorized the DOL to fill.76 The court went further to say that “express congressional
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking is a very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment.”77
In the final step of Chevron analysis, the court found the DOL’s interpretation reasonable
as a matter of policy.78 The court pointed to the FMLA’s broad purpose in entitling employees to
medical leave so that they may care for themselves and their families.79 The court claimed the
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Id.
Id.
73
Id.
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Woods, 864 F.3d at 168.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 168-69 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)).
78
Id. at 169.
79
Id.
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interpretation is “neither arbitrary or capricious,” comported with notice-and-comment, and
evidenced “well-reasoned judgement.”80 Therefore, the court determined that the DOL was
entitled to deference and held that a “negative factor” standard applies in FMLA retaliation
claims.81
The Split
The main point of difference between the circuits seems to be the textual source of
retaliation claims rather than the causation standard to employ. Courts find the source of the
claims to be rooted in either paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or a combination of the two.82 Most circuits,
despite finding different provisions of the FMLA to be the source of the claim, utilize the
“negative factor” standard articulated by the DOL.83
The majority of courts find that the claim is rooted within subparagraph (a)(1). The Third
Circuit agrees with the Second Circuit that subparagraph (a)(1) is the textual source.84 The Third
Circuit had previously found the authority for FMLA retaliation claims to be within the DOL
regulation itself, but, in Egan v. Delaware River Port Authority, the court analyzed the
construction of the regulation under Chevron.85 In determining whether the FMLA is ambiguous
on the issue, the court asserted that it must “read the language in [the] broader context of the
statute as a whole” and that if the language is “clear and unambiguous, we uphold the plain
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Id.
Woods, 864 F.3d at 169.
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Bryant, 538 F.3d at 401(finding the claim within the language of (a)(2)); Egan, 851 F.3d at 269. ((a)(1)); Colburn,
429 F.3d at 331. (within the entirety of Section 2654).
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See Bryant, 538 F.3d at 401-02; see also Egan, 851 F.3d at 269-71; Colburn, 429 F.3d at 331-32; Woods, 864
F.3d at 166-69.
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meaning of the statute.”86 The court found that the language “interference” within (a)(1) is
subject to multiple interpretations.87 Specifically, the Third Circuit found “interference”
unclear.88 One reasonable interpretation is that “[i]nterference could also occur if an employee
fears that he or she will be retaliated against for taking such leave.”89 Conversely, “interference”
could be read to exclude retaliation, and apply only to impeding an employee’s ability to take
leave or to be returned to an equivalent position.90 Therefore, the court found the statute
ambiguous.91
The Third Circuit recognized that the DOL finds the source of retaliation claims in
paragraph (a)(1) of the FMLA. 92 The court then determined whether this interpretation is
reasonable construction of the statute.93 The court claimed that this conclusion is “consistent with
the purpose of the FMLA” and that “the established understanding at the time the FMLA was
enacted was that employer actions that deter employees’ participation in protected activities
constitute interference or restraint with the employees’ exercise of their rights, and attaching
negative consequences to the exercise of protected rights surely tends to chill an employee’s
willingness to exercise those rights.”94 The Third Circuit also shares the Sixth Circuit’s opinion
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Id. (quoting Geisinger Cmty. Med. Ctr. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 794 F.3d 383, 391 (3d Cir.
2015); Cheruku v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 662 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2011)).
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See Egan, 851 F.3d at 270.
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Id.
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Id. at 271.
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Id. (quoting Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)) (Internal quotes omitted).
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that allowing for retaliation would undermine the purpose of the FMLA as evidence that DOL’s
construction of the statute is reasonable.95
The Third Circuit then turned to whether the “negative factor” causation standard
suggested by the DOL is a reasonable interpretation of the statute’s plain language.96 The court
explained that a “negative factor” standard “makes sense, especially since a claim of retaliation
includes an implication that the employer was motivated at least in part by the employee's use of
FMLA leave.”97 The court noted that (a)(1) does not expressly require a showing of intent by the
employer, so that a lesser standard of causation is not barred by the language of the statute and
therefore a gap for the DOL to fill.98 The court recognized the possible implication of Supreme
Court cases analyzing the language of anti-discrimination provisions within the ADEA and Title
VII, but concluded that those cases do not apply for two reasons.99 First, there is no ambiguity
because (a)(1) “does not provide a causation standard and thus does not unambiguously require
the use of “but-for” causation.”100 Secondly, the DOL’s use of “the phrase ‘a negative factor,’
resembles the lessened causation standard in [the Title VII amendment] and stands in contrast to
the “because” language in the ADEA and Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.”101 To this point,
the court reasoned that a “negative factor” was a reasonably constructed standard in light of
Congress’s willingness to implement a lessened standard in the anti-discrimination provisions in

Id. (citing Bryant, 538 F.3d at 401). The court cites the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Bryant in support that the DOL’s
reasonable interpretation of paragraph (a)(1), even though the Sixth Circuit was analyzing the regulations
interpretation of (a)(2). See Bryant, 538 F.3d at 401.
96
Egan, 851 F.3d at 271-72.
97
Id. at 272.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 273.
100
Id.
101
Id.
95
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Title VII.102 Therefore, the court gave deference to the DOL and applies a “negative factor”
causation standard.103
Some courts disagree and find subparagraph (a)(2) as the textual source of FMLA
retaliation claims. The Sixth Circuit, for example, disagrees a with the Second and Third
Circuits, at least on the issue of source.104 Similar to the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, in
Bryant v. Dollar General Corp., was most interested with an employee’s right to reinstatement,
to be restored to an equivalent position when returning from leave.105 The court stated that “the
FMLA does not provide leave for leave's sake, but instead provides leave with an expectation an
employee will return to work after the leave ends.”106 The Sixth Circuit continued that “any right
to take unpaid leave would be utterly meaningless if the statute's bar against discrimination failed
to prohibit employers from considering an employee's FMLA leave as a negative factor in
employment decisions.”107 While the analysis is similar to the of the Second Circuit, the Sixth
Circuit views retaliation as a sort of discrimination against employees who take FMLA leave,
rather than “interference” with their right to do so.108 This determination is what places the claim
under (a)(2), instead of (a)(1).109
However, the question before the Sixth Circuit was not which causation standard ought to
apply to retaliation claims, but whether retaliation claims were authorized under the FMLA at
all.110 After establishing that the cause of action exists under paragraph (a)(2), the court
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Egan, 851 F.3d at 274.
104
Bryant, 538 F.3d at 401.
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Id.
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Id. (quoting Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 978 (8th Cir.2005)).
107
Id.
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Id.
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concluded broadly that the DOL’s interpretation of section 2615 is therefore reasonable and a
valid exercise of agency authority.111 Determining that the DOL had the requisite authority, the
court then gave Chevron deference to the DOL, holding that the FMLA “prohibit[s] employers
from considering an employee's use of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment
decisions.”112 The court, in doing so, adopted the “negative factor” causation standard but does
so finding the claim for retaliation to be grounded in paragraph (a)(2).113 The court adopted this
standard without any inquiry into whether the language of (a)(2) is ambiguous on the standard of
causation.
Similarly finding subparagraph (a)(2) to be the textual source of the claim, the district
court in Woods, took the next step and analyzed the language of the provision for ambiguity.114
The court analyzed the language of paragraph (a)(2), having thought it to be the source of the
claim under Circuit precedent and having similar language to the provisions of the ADEA and
Title VII, previously analyzed by the Supreme Court.115 Specifically, the court pointed to the
language used in paragraph (a)(2), that it is “unlawful for any employer to discharge ... any
individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by the FMLA.”116 The court put emphasis
on the word “for” within the paragraph, equating it to the “because” language indicative of “but
for” causation.117 The court also noted the Second Circuit’s stance that the “FMLA's antiretaliation provision has the same underlying purpose as Title VII—and almost identical
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Id.
Id. at 402.
113
Id.
114
Woods, No. Woods v. Start Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., No. 13CIV4719AMDSMG, 2016 WL 590458,
at 2* (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2016), vacated, 864 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2017).
115
Id.
116
Id. at 2* (citing 29 U.S.C. §2615 (a)(2)) (interion quotations omitted).
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Id.
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wording.”118 Therefore, the court held that because of the utilization of the word “for” in (a)(2),
that a “but for” causation standard applies to FMLA retaliation claims.119 Because the Second
Circuit, the appellate court reviewing this case, found the source of the claim to be in (a)(1)
rather than (a)(2), it did not address the accuracy of the trial court’s analysis.120
Other courts, however, have decided not to designate either subparagraph as the source of
FLMA retaliation claims. The First Circuit, for example, refrained from the debate over which
paragraph held the claim and instead found that retaliation claims are found somewhere within
the entirety of Section 3654. Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Division
acknowledged disagreement between the circuits as to the source of the claim, but viewed the
distinction as unimportant.121 Instead, the court claimed that cause of action is recognized
generally “in the statute and specifically [in] the interpretative regulation 29 C.F.R. §
825.220(c).”122 The court looked to the DOL regulation as an unambiguous interpretation of the
FMLA, permitting retaliation within section 2615.123 The court referenced the term
“interference” in paragraph (a)(1) as a point of difference between the circuits and the confusion
over whether “interference” includes acts of retaliation.124 The court stated, however, that
whether a claim is “interference” or not—i.e. plead under (a)(1) or (a)(2)—a claim’s “elements
actually differ depending on whether the plaintiff is, at bottom, claiming that the employer
denied his or her substantive rights under the FMLA or that the employer retaliated against him
or her for having exercised or attempted to exercise those rights.”125 Therefore, the court did not
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recognize a distinction between the standards of proof under either provision; instead, it drew a
distinction in the standard of proof between the different kinds of claims brought under the two
provisions.126 The court asserted that retaliation claims under the FMLA, whether interference or
not, always bear the same standard of proof—the “negative factor” causation standard put forth
by the DOL regulation.127
While there is disagreement as to the textual source of retaliation claims, most courts
agree that a negative factor standard ought to apply.128 But, as evident in Woods, (a)(1) and (a)(2)
may carry different standards of causation.129 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADEA
and Title VII address this concern.
SECTION III
ADEA and Title VII Supreme Court Analysis
Courts recognize that one strategy to resolve the issue is to examine how the Supreme
Court has interpreted similar language in like statutes.130 The ADEA and Title VII, specifically,
contain anti-discrimination provisions similar to the provisions of the FMLA. Courts will often
look to Supreme Court cases analyzing these statutes for guidance.131 Two cases, Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc. and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, are
particularly helpful.
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In Gross, the question before the Court was whether direct evidence of discrimination is
required to obtain a jury instruction of a mixed-motive causation standard under the ADEA.132
The Court stated that the language of a statute must be assumed to express legislative intent
through its ordinary meaning.133 The relevant provision of the ADEA provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.134

The Court determined that the key language evidencing causation within this provision is the
phrase “because of.”135 In order to determine the ordinary meaning of “because of,” the Court
turned to the dictionary.136 Webster’s Dictionary provided that definition of the word “because”
is “by reason of.”137 This definition led the Court to interpret the ADEA to mean the
“requirement that an employer took adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’
that the employer decided to act.”138 The Court found this was indicative of congressional intent
to establish a “but for” causation standard under this provision of the ADEA.139
Further, the Court claimed that “where the statutory text is silent on the allocation of the
burden of persuasion, we begin with the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of
failing to prove their claims.”140 The Court noted that there is no evidence of congressional intent
to suggest a departure from this default rule and establish a mixed-motive standard under the
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ADEA.141 The Court, therefore, held that the plain language of ADEA requires the burden
remain on the plaintiff to prove his protected actions were the “but for” cause of the employer’s
adverse decision.142
The petitioner pointed to an amendment made to Title VII explicitly incorporating a
“motivating factor” standard discrimination claims brought under Title VII as evidence
suggesting that the same standard ought to apply to the ADEA.143 The amendment provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.144

The Court, however, was unpersuaded and held that mixed-motive is not the correct causation
standard and that the language of the statute suggests the proper standard is “but for.”145 The
Court stated, “we must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different
statute without careful and critical examination.”146 The Court found that the fact that the
ADEA’s text has not been amended to address the issue of causation after the changes to Title
VII was evidence of congressional intent not to impose the same standard onto the ADEA.147
The Court reasoned that Congress had the opportunity to amend the ADEA at the time it
amended Title VII, but chose not to.148 The Court stated “negative implications raised by
disparate provisions are strongest when the provisions were considered simultaneously when the
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language raising the implication was inserted.”149 Therefore, the Court asserted that the plain text
of the statute, rather than another statute’s provisions, is the primary consideration when
determining the causation standard of a statute that does not expressly provide one.150
Similarly, in Nassar, the Court analyzed the scope of the amendment to Title VII
referenced in Gross to determine if it extends to retaliation claims under Title VII.151 The
amendment expressly established a “motivating factor” standard of causation in status
discrimination cases, that is, those based on race, sex, religion, etc., but makes no reference to
retaliation claims.152 The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees … because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.153
The Court began by noting that the default standard in torts claims, such as retaliation, is
“but for.”154 The Court referred to the Restatement of Torts in claiming “[c]ausation in fact—i.e.,
proof that the defendant's conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff's injury—is a standard
requirement of any tort claim.”155 From this point, the Court asserted that Congress enacts
legislation with the knowledge of this default rule, and, in absence of any indication to depart
from this default, it is presumed that Congress intended to establish a “but for” causation
standard.156
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The Court dismissed the argument that the amendment extends to retaliation claims
because the amendment is found in another part of the statute separate from the provision
creating retaliation claims and which also expressly limits itself to a list of specific prohibited
acts under the statute—excluding retaliation.157 Therefore, the Court turned to the plain text
language of the applicable provision to determine what causation standard Congress intended to
apply.158
The Court drew a comparison between the language used in the ADEA provision,
analyzed in Gross, with the language utilized in this provision of Title VII.159 Title VII uses the
word “because,” and although not exactly the same as the “because of” language which appears
in the ADEA, the Court found that “because” alone is similarly indicative of a “but for” standard
of causation.160 The Court commented that the result in Gross not necessarily binding for other
statutes, but that the similarity of the language used in the provisions informed the Court’s
determination of congressional intent.161 Therefore, the Court held that although the amendment
calls for a “motivating factor”” standard to apply for some claims under Title VII, “but for” is the
appropriate standard for retaliation claims under the statute.162
SECTION IV
Argument
The Supreme Court would likely find that retaliation claims brought under the FMLA
arise from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). In so doing, the Court would likely then determine that the
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language of the provision is unambiguous in light of the decisions in Gross and Nassar.
Therefore, the Court would not afford deference to the DOL and instead look to the plain
language of the statute for congressional intent on the issue of causation. Similar to Gross and
Nassar, the Court would likely find that “but for” causation is the appropriate standard to apply
to retaliation claims brought under the FMLA.
The circuits err in their analysis of whether the FMLA is ambiguous as to the source of
retaliation claim within section 2615. The plain language of paragraph (a)(2) consists of nearly
identical language of that used in the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADEA and Title VII. The
Second Circuit, in Woods, suggested that (a)(2) could not possibly be the source of a retaliation
claim because a victim of retaliation cannot be said to have opposed any practice made unlawful
under the statute.163 However, the anti-retaliation provision within Title VII, which the Supreme
Court has determined to be the source of retaliation claims, utilizes the same “opposed” language
as paragraph (a)(2) of the FMLA. The language of Title VII states, in relevant part, “It shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
… because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter.”164 Similarly, the language of paragraph (a)(2) states, “It shall be unlawful for any
employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing
any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.”165 Both provisions use nearly identical language
to convey that it is unlawful to discriminate for “opposing” unlawful practices.
The Court would likely agree with the trial court in Woods that the similarity between the
subject matter of the statutes, both being anti-discrimination statutes, and the utilization of nearly
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identical language suggests congressional intent to establish liability the same for claims brought
under each.166 In light of the Supreme Court’s recognition of retaliation claims under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII, its similarity to (a)(2), and no action by Congress expressing
any indication to the contrary following the Courts decision in Nassar, the Court would likely
find that (a)(2) is the textual source of retaliation claims under the FMLA.
The Court would then likely find that paragraph (a)(2) unambiguously establishes a “but
for” causation standard for retaliation claims. The Court has articulated that the next step in the
analysis is to look at the language of the provision for its ordinary meaning.167 The Court, in
Nassar, indicated that the default standard of causation in tort actions, such as retaliation claims,
is a “but for” standard.168 The Court noted that Congress is aware of this backdrop when passing
legislation.169 Therefore, Congress must indicate that it intended to depart from this default in
order for another standard of causation to apply.170 Paragraph (a)(2), does not indicate a
departure from this default, but instead likely evidences congressional intent to establish a “but
for” causation standard.
The trial court in Woods suggested that the term “for” within (a)(2) was similarly
indicative of a “but for” causation standard, like the “because” language utilized in the antiretaliation provisions of the ADEA and Title VII.171 The Court would likely follow the same
procedure as it did in Gross and refer to the dictionary for the ordinary meaning of the language
of paragraph (a)(2).172 Specifically the Court would examine the plain meaning of the term “for”
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within the excerpt from paragraph (a)(2): “It shall be unlawful for,” like the Court did for the
language “because of” in the excerpt from the ADEA: “because of such individual's age.”173
Webster’s dictionary provides that the definition of “for” is “because of.”174 The court is likely to
inspect the word “for” because it is one of the few differences in the language of the antiretaliation provisions of the ADEA and Title VII as compared to the FMLA, and was a point of
interest in the Third Circuit’s decision in Egan.175 This is the same language the Court
determined to be indicative of a “but for” causation standard in Gross.176 While the court has
articulated that the analysis of “because of” in Gross is not controlling to the standards of other
statutes, it can inform the Court’s decision.177 Like the ADEA and Tile VII in Nassar, the ADEA
and the FMLA are both statutes barring discrimination and the language of the relevant
provisions are nearly identical.178 This similarly is such that the Court would likely find that the
term “for” similarly displays congressional intent to establish a “but for” standard of causation,
just as it did for the term “because” in Nassar.179
The failure of the majority of circuits’ inquiries into the FMLA’s ambiguity is that they
ignore the similarities between the language and subject matter of paragraph (a)(2) and the antiretaliation provision of Title VII, and the inquiries end too early. The Third Circuit, for example,
found ambiguity in the word “interferes” within (a)(1) as a determinative indication that the
statute was ambiguous as to the source of retaliation claims.180 However, the court did this
without looking to the language of (a)(2) to determine if that provision was unambiguously the
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source of the claim.181 Additionally, once making this conclusion, the court prematurely gave
Chevron deference to the DOL’s interpretation that the claim arises from (a)(1). This conclusion
skewed the remainder of the court’s analysis.182
Looking solely at the language of paragraph (a)(1) makes the argument for ambiguity
more reasonable. Circuits’ disagreement between the scope and application of the word
“interferes” evidences this ambiguity. This sort of ambiguity goes beyond the ordinary meaning
of the word. Instead, explanation as to how the word “interferes” is to be applied is required.
From this determination, Chevron deference toward the DOL’s interpretation becomes more
reasonable as well. As discussed in Section II, the DOL was delegated the authority to fill gaps
left by Congress to enforce the provision of the FMLA at issue. Therefore, if retaliation was
grounded in (a)(1), Chevron deference would be warranted so long as the DOL’s regulation is
reasonable.
Solely under paragraph (a)(1), the DOL’s interpretation is likely reasonable. Both the
Second and Third Circuits argued the DOL’s interpretation is reasonable by making conclusory
statements such as it “makes sense” and is not “arbitrary nor capricious” without any real support
for those conclusions.183 However, the Third Circuit made a compelling argument in that (a)(1)
“does not explicitly require a relationship between intent and outcome.”184 If that were the case,
then an employee could establish liability without a showing that the employer acted “because”
the employee exercised his or her rights. This possibility moves away from the default “but for”
standard. Therefore, under (a)(1), a lessened standard of causation would be a reasonable
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interpretation, and deference would likely be given to the DOL. However, the Court would likely
find the cause of action under (a)(2), rather than under (a)(1). Therefore, the Third Circuit’s
analysis under (a)(1), whether accurate or not, is irrelevant because
The Sixth Circuit similarly ends the inquiry too early. In coming to the conclusion that
legislative intent and policy dictated a finding that the claim for retaliation arises out of (a)(2),
the court unnecessarily afforded Chevron deference to the entirety of 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).185
Having found that the statute unambiguously authorized retaliation claims, the initial inquiry into
whether Chevron analysis is necessary is erroneous. The court should have instead followed the
congressional intent within the plain language of the provision. Although not deciding on the
issue of causation standard, the court nevertheless adopts the DOL’s full interpretation of the
provision, which includes the “negative factor” causation standard.186 This is contrary to the “but
for” language of (a)(2), the very provision the court found to be the source of retaliation claims.
Additionally, this goes too far in affording deference on not only the issue of whether the claim
exists, the issue before the court, but also on causation, which the court did not analyze.
While a majority of courts seem to agree that a “negative factor” standard applies to
retaliation claims under the FMLA, the Supreme Court would likely disagree. Under Chevron, if
the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, then courts must follow the legislature’s intent. In
the case of the FMLA, Congress drafted (a)(2) nearly identically to the anti-retaliation provision
it drafted in Title VII.187 It cannot be said that Congress’s intent is unclear—anti-retaliation
claims under the FMLA arise under (a)(2). Similarly unambiguous, Congress used the same sort
of language the Court found indicative of a “but for” causation standard in Title VII. Therefore,
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the Supreme Court would likely hold retaliation claims are rooted in 29 U.S.C. §2615(a)(2) and
that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving causation under a “but for” standard.
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